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In this paper, I examine the macroeconomic impact of inward FDI in Japan. From a general 
equilibrium point of view of the macroeconomy, probably the most important host country benefit of 
inward FDI is improvements in productivity caused by the inflow of managerial resources. In the 
first part of this paper, which is largely based on the results of Fukao, Ito and Kwon (2005), I review 
the evidence suggesting that inward FDI raises the average total factor productivity of firms in Japan. 
In the second part, using a general equilibrium model of an open macroeconomy, I simulate the 
macroeconomic impact of an increase in the inward FDI stock. The results suggest that if Prime 
Minister Abe’s goal on inward FDI, which is to increase the inward FDI stock to 5 percent of GDP 
by the end of 2010 is achieved, this will help to raise Japan’s GDP by 0.226 percent and real wage 
rates by 0.156 percent. Dividend payments abroad by foreign-owned firms and the fall in Japan’s 
foreign investment income caused by the inflow of capital (or the decline in capital outflows), will 
make the increase in Japan’s GNP (which includes net foreign investment income) smaller than the 
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According to economic theory, foreign direct investment (FDI) is a form of long-term international 
capital movement which is accompanied by investors’ intangible assets, such as the accumulated 
technological knowledge through R&D, management skills, or marketing know-how based on past 
advertising activity. Because of these intangible assets, affiliates owned by foreign firms are 
expected to enjoy higher total factor productivity (TFP)
1 and profit rates than the average domestic 
firm. Such inflows of intangible assets will benefit the Japanese economy. In this paper, I 
quantitatively evaluate how much the Japanese economy will benefit from increases in inward FDI. 
 
In the first half of this paper, I review some econometric evidence from Fukao, Ito and Kwon (2005) 
which suggests that foreign firms display higher productivity than domestic firms. The method of 
investigation in that study is based on the following reasoning: if foreign firms in Japan possess 
technologies that are superior to those of their domestically-owned counterparts, then this should 
manifest itself in higher total factor productivity (TFP). In this case, Japan benefits from inward FDI. 
Like FDI in other developed economies, the largest part of recent inflows to Japan took the form of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As). There is, of course, the possibility that foreign firms may enjoy 
greater productivity because they pick firms with higher TFP as M&A targets. In order to take 
account of this possibility, the study also tests whether foreigners have tended to acquire firms that 
already enjoy higher TFP, or whether the acquired firms’ productivity improved after the take-over. 
 
The second part of this paper then uses the results of Fukao, Ito and Kown (2005) on the effects of 
FDI on firm-level productivity to estimate the impact of inward foreign investment on Japan’s 
macroeconomy. Since such investments represent international capital flows accompanied by 
intangible assets, it is possible to use standard economic theory on the international movement of 
production factors for the macroeconomic analysis. In the case of FDI, the home country will benefit 
from the earnings of their affiliates abroad, while in the host country, the higher productivity of 
foreign firms will increase real wage rates and benefit workers. Foreign firms will have a higher rate 
of return to capital because of their higher productivity, and this higher rate of return to capital will 
induce capital deepening through capital imports. This capital deepening will further raise real wage 
rates and benefit workers in the host country. Using this reasoning and a simple standard macro 
model, the effects of inward FDI on Japan’s macroeconomy and the balance of payments structure 
will be calculated. 
                                                        
1 Several recent studies conducting macroeconomic growth accounting exercises have tried to isolate 
intangible assets from TFP growth and treat them as a factor input (see, e.g., Corrado et al. 2005, 2006). 
Since it is very difficult to measure the accumulation of some types of intangible assets at the firm level, 
in this paper, I take the more traditional approach of treating intangible assets not as factor inputs, so that 
TFP growth includes the contribution of intangible asset accumulation. 2 
 
 
The analysis in this paper focuses on the direct benefits of the higher productivity of foreign firms, 
which is relatively easy to measure. However, in addition, FDI may also improve Japan’s social 
welfare through a variety other channels. When foreign firms introduce new goods and services, 
consumers in the host country benefit from these innovations In the case of services, many of which 
are non-tradable, customers would not be able to enjoy the new services offered by foreign firms if 
these do not set up a supply-base in the country. Inward FDI may also enhance competition in the 
host country market and improve market performance. Finally, Japanese firms may also benefit from 
technological spillovers from advanced foreign firms. These are all pertinent issues with regard to 
inward FDI and I hope to address these difficult-to-measure benefits in the future.  
 
2. Does Inward FDI Increase Japan’s TFP? 
 
Concerning the potential benefits of inward foreign direct investment for the host economy, it has 
been frequently claimed that such investment, and especially greenfield investment, generates new 
employment. It has also been argued that export-oriented foreign firms help to improve the host 
country’s current account balance. However, it is important to note that these arguments are based on 
a partial equilibrium approach and do not take account of second-order effects throughout the 
economy. For example, the increased competition from foreign firms may also lead to a reduction of 
employment at domestically-owned firms. Moreover, exports by foreign firms may lead to an 
appreciation of the host country’s currency and therefore potentially do not help to improve its 
current account balance. In the end, standard macroeconomic theory suggests, the current account 
balance of an economy with free international capital flows is determined by the saving-investment 
balance. 
 
From such a general equilibrium point of view, probably the most important host country benefit 
from inward FDI is the improvement in productivity brought about by the inflow of managerial 
resources. In this subsection, relying on the results of Fukao, Ito and Kwon (2005; hereafter referred 
to as Fukao et al.), I review the evidence that foreign firms indeed show a better performance than 
the average domestic firm.
2  
                                                        
2 Quite a number of studies, on various countries, have dealt with this topic. These typically show that 
labor tends to be more productive in foreign-affiliated companies than in domestic companies. See, for 
example, Blomström and Sjöholm (1998) on Indonesia and Griffith and Simpson (2001) on Britain. 
Doms and Jensen (1998) in their study on the US found that US multinational plants had the highest labor 
productivity, followed by foreign-owned establishments, while US-owned non-multinational plants had 
the lowest labor productivity. However, this is generally due to a greater concentration of capital 
investment; total factor productivity (TFP) analyses indicate that foreign firms’ productivity is not 
necessarily higher if differences in capital intensity are taken into account. Studies coming to this 
conclusion include Ito (2004b) on Indonesia, Ramstetter (2001, 2002) and Ito (2002, 2004a) on Thailand, 
and Globerman, Ries, and Vertinsky (1994) on Canada. 3 
 
 
Comparing the Performance of Foreign and Domestic Firms in Japan 
 
Fukao et al. used the firm-level panel data underlying the Basic Survey of Japanese Business 
Structure and Activities conducted annually by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). 
The survey covers all firms with at least 50 employees and ¥30 million of paid-in capital in the 
Japanese manufacturing and mining sectors and several service industries. Fukao et al. used the data 
for manufacturing firms. Their data cover the period 1994–2000 (1994–2001 in the case of the 




In the survey, firms were asked what percentage of their paid-in capital was owned by foreigners and 
whether they had a foreign parent owning more than fifty percent of the firm. Based on this 
information, Fukao et al. determined whether a firm is foreign-owned. They used the following two 
definitions of foreign-owned firms: a broad definition, where one or several foreigners own 33.4 
percent or more of the firm’s paid-in capital in total, and a narrow definition, where foreign-owned 
firms are those majority-owned by a single foreign firm. It should be noted, though, that there are 
several Japanese firms where more than one third of issued stocks are owned by foreign institutional 
investors as portfolio investment and there is therefore a risk that the broad definition includes such 
firms. In this paper, I mainly refer to the results for the narrow definition. 
 
Table 1, which is based on the METI data, shows how the presence of foreign-owned firms in 
Japan’s manufacturing sector increased in 1994–2000. The number of foreign-owned firms grew 
from 195 in 1994 to 236 in 2000. During the same period, the sales of foreign-owned firms nearly 
doubled from ¥12.2 trillion to ¥23.7 trillion. 62 foreign-owned firms exited and 73 foreign-owned 
firms newly entered in this period. 61 domestically-owned firms in 1994 had become foreign-owned 
by 2000. I regard these firms as having been acquired by foreign firms.  
 
INSERT Table 1 
 
The increase in foreign-owned firms’ market share was mainly caused by these 61 M&As. The total 
sales of these 61 firms amounted to ¥14.1 trillion in 2000, which is greater than the total increase in 
                                                        
3  Kimura and Kiyota (2007), who used the same data source, examined the relationship between 
ownership and firms’ performance indicators (such as the capital-labor ratio, real value-added and TFP). 
Covering the period 1994–1998 (fiscal years), their study shows that foreign-ownership has a positive 
impact on the growth rate of real value-added, the rate of return to capital, and TFP. Compared with 
Kimura and Kiyota’s analysis, the Fukao et al. study is more sharply focused on the TFP level as a 
measure of performance and the effect of out-in and in-in M&As. 
 4 
 
foreign-owned firms’ sales of ¥11.5 trillion in the 1994–2000 period.  
 
Fukao et al. measure each firm’s TFP level using the method developed by Good, Nadiri, and Sickles 
(1997). Figure 1 compares the histograms of foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms’ TFP. The 
figure shows that foreign-owned firms tend to have substantially higher TFP levels than 
domestically-owned firms. The distributions are based on pooled data and determinants of the TFP 
level other than foreign ownership are not taken into account. Therefore, the derived interpretation 
carries the risk of being biased. For example, suppose that the average TFP level grows over time 
and the market presence of foreign-owned firms is also on the rise. In that case, since observations 
for foreign firms are concentrated in the latter part of the observation period when the average TFP 
level is higher, in pooled data for the entire period, foreign firms will display higher average TFP 
than domestic firms even when there is no gap in TFP in any particular year. In order to avoid this 
kind of bias, Fukao et al. conducted a regression analysis.  
 
 
INSERT Figure 1 
 
Firms’ performance is regressed on the foreign-ownership dummy and firms’ other characteristics. 
As a first step, only the industry and year dummies are used. The main results (using the narrow 
definition of foreign-owned firms) are as follows (Table 2): 
 
 
1） Foreign-owned  firms’TFP is about 8 percent higher and their current profit-to-sales ratio 
1.5 percentage points higher.  
2）  Foreign-owned firms enjoy slightly higher TFP growth. 
3）  Foreign-owned firms spend proportionately more on R&D per worker. They also have a 
significantly higher capital-labor ratio. Probably because of this, the labor productivity of 
foreign-owned firms is higher than that of domestically-owned firms. 
4）  There is no significant difference between domestically-owned and foreign-owned firms in 
the growth rates of real sales and employment. But foreign-owned firms show a 
significantly lower growth rate of tangible assets. 
5）  Average wages at foreign firms are ¥1.28 million higher per year. 
   
INSERT Table 2 
 
As we have seen, foreign-owned firms tend to conduct more R&D and pay higher wage rates. 
Although their TFP level is significantly higher than that of Japanese firms, this difference might be 5 
 
caused not by the transfer of managerial resources, knowledge, etc., from their parent firms but by 
their own R&D activities or the (potentially) higher quality of their labor. In order to test which of 
the above two hypotheses is correct, Fukao et al. empirically examine the determinants of each 
firm’s TFP level and TFP growth rate. Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the 
regression are presented in Table 3, while the results of this regression are reported in Table 4. The 
regression is conducted using OLS and pooled data for 1994–2000. 
 
INSERT Tables 3 and 4 
 
Again, foreign-owned firms display a TFP level about 5 percent higher than that of Japanese firms 
even after controlling for other factors such as R&D intensity, the percentage of non-production 
workers, the number of years since the firm was established, and firm size (sales) in addition to 
industry differences (industry dummies) and the observation year (Table 4.a). However, when Fukao 
at al. add firm dummies to the regression model, the gap between the TFP level of foreign-owned 
firms and Japanese firms becomes insignificant. This result suggests that the strong correlation 
between foreign ownership and the TFP level is at least partly the result of the initially higher TFP 
level of the firms later acquired by foreign firms. I will discuss this issue in more detail later. 
 
Table 4.b shows that foreign-owned firms have a 1.4–1.8 percentage-point higher (annual) TFP 
growth rate than Japanese firms even after controlling for other factors. Yet, this positive correlation 
between foreign ownership and the TFP growth rate again becomes insignificant in the fixed effect 
models.  
 
Overall, the comparison between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms shows that foreign-
owned companies had a 5 percent higher TFP level as well as higher returns on capital. Moreover, 
they displayed a higher capital-labor ratio and R&D investment per worker. They also enjoyed a 
higher TFP growth rate. Probably reflecting the higher levels of capital intensity and technology, 
foreign-owned companies showed higher labor productivity and wage rates as well. But in the fixed 
effect models, Fukao et al. could not find a significant positive correlation between foreign 
ownership and the TFP level or growth rate.  
 
 
Are Good Firms Chosen as M&A Targets?  
 
As pointed out above, there are two possible theoretical explanations for the positive correlation 
between foreign ownership and productivity. One potential explanation is that foreign-owned firms 
enjoy greater productivity because they choose domestic firms with higher TFP as M&A targets. I 6 
 
call this mechanism the selection effect. The alternative explanation is that Japanese firms that were 
acquired by foreign firms receive new technologies and management skills from their foreign 
owners and this transfer of intangible assets boosts their TFP. For short, I call this mechanism the 
technology-transfer effect. In order to determine which one of the two effects is responsible for the 
positive correlation between foreign ownership and productivity, Fukao et al. conduct two empirical 
tests. First, they estimate a Probit model explaining whether a firm is chosen as an M&A target 
based on its TFP level and other characteristics. Second, they test whether the TFP of Japanese firms 
that were acquired by foreign firms improves after the investment.  
 
Following the narrow definition of foreign ownership above, Fukao et al. define out-in M&As as 
cases where a firm that did not have a foreign parent firm with majority ownership at time t–1 comes 
to have a foreign parent firm with majority ownership at time t. In order to compare out-in M&As 
with in-in M&As (M&As involving only domestic firms), they define in-in M&As as cases where a 
firm that did not have a parent firm with majority ownership at time t–1 comes to have a domestic 
parent firm with majority ownership at time t. Table 5 shows the number of out-in and in-in M&A 
cases in Fukao et al.’s dataset. It includes 67 cases of narrowly defined out-in M&As and 1,362 cases 
of in-in M&As. 
 
INSERT Table 5 
 
Using the panel data of manufacturing firms for 1994–2001, Fukao et al. estimated a Probit model 
explaining whether a firm is chosen as an M&A target based on its TFP level and other 
characteristics. The dependent variables are the out-in M&A dummy and the in-in M&A dummy. 
Each M&A dummy variable takes value one when this type of M&A occurs. As explanatory 
variables, Fukao et al. use the logarithm of the TPF level, the growth rate of TFP, firm size (the 
number of workers), the current profit/sales ratio, the total liabilities/total assets ratio, year dummies, 
and industry dummies. All the explanatory variables are values at the period (time t–1) preceding the 
M&A transaction (time t).  
 
Table 6 shows the estimation results. The determinants of M&As are surprisingly different for out-in 
and in-in M&As. In the case of out-in M&As, firms with higher TFP, a higher profit rate, and of a 
larger size are chosen as targets. In the case of in-in M&As, firms with a lower profit rate, larger 
liabilities, and of a smaller size are chosen as targets. In both cases, the growth rate of firms’ TFP 
(from t-2 to t-1) does not have any significant effect on the selection. 
 
INSERT Table 6 
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These results imply that foreign firms acquire Japanese firms that already at the time of acquisition 
show a better performance. It thus seems that at least part of the higher TFP of foreign-owned firms 
is the result of the selection effect. In contrast, in-in M&As tend to display characteristics of rescue 
missions. One possible explanation is that in-in M&As in Japan are mainly conducted within vertical 
and horizontal keiretsu networks and financially distressed small firms are salvaged by other 
member firms through M&As. 
 
Do M&As Improve the Performance of Target Firms? 
 
Next, I will explain the technology-transfer effect. Fukao et al. examined this effect by estimating 
how the performance of out-in and in-in M&A target firms changes after the acquisition. The 
following econometric model is estimated: 
t f
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where Yf, t denotes the performance of firm f in year t. As Yf, t they used the logarithm of the TFP level, 
the logarithm of the number of workers, and the current profit/sales ratio. It is quite likely that it 
takes several years for technology-transfer effects to manifest themselves and in order to take 
account of this time lag, the effects two years (τ=1) and three years (τ=2) after the acquisition are 
examined. As explanatory variables, they used out-in and in-in M&A dummies in year t, the values 
of the three performance variables (the logarithm of the TFP level, the logarithm of the number of 
workers, and the current profit/sales ratio) in year t-1, the R&D/sales ratio, the total liabilities/total 
assets ratio, industry dummies, and year dummies. In the case of the estimation where changes in 
employment are the dependent variable, they used sales per worker as an additional explanatory 
variable in order to take account of labor hoarding.  
 
The regression results on the effects two years (τ=1) after the acquisition are reported in Table 7, 
while the results on the effects three years later (τ=2) are reported in Table 8.  
 
INSERT Tables 7 and 8 
 
The results indicate that out-in M&As improve target firms’ TFP level and current profit/sales ratio. 
Compared with out-in M&As, in-in M&As bring a smaller and slower improvement in target firms’ 
TFP level and there is no improvement in the current profit/sales ratio. The impact of out-in M&As 
on target firms’ employment is also sharply different from that of in-in M&As. In the case of in-in 
M&As, there is a significant and positive effect on employment two years after the acquisition, while 
in the case of out-in M&As, the effect on employment is negative but insignificant.  8 
 
 
Overall, Fukao et al. found some evidence showing that target firms’ TFP improved as a result of 
out-in M&As. Compared with in-in M&As, out-in M&As bring a larger and quicker improvement in 
TFP and the profit rate but, at least in the short-run (i.e., two years after the acquisition) do not 
increase employment at the target firms.  
 
The overall comparison between foreign-owned and Japanese companies shows that foreign-owned 
companies enjoyed 5 percent higher TFP as well as higher earnings and returns on capital.  They also 
displayed a higher capital-labor ratio and higher R&D intensity. Reflecting their higher TFP and 
labor-saving production patterns, foreign-owned companies showed higher labor productivity and 
wage rates as well. By estimating Probit models, it was found that foreign firms acquire Japanese 
firms with higher TFP levels and higher profit rates. In contrast, in-in M&As seem to have the 
characteristics of rescue missions. Small firms with a higher total liability/total asset ratio tend to be 
chosen as targets of in-in M&As. Fukao et al. also estimated the dynamic effects of M&As on target 
firms. The results indicate that out-in M&As improve target firms’ TFP level and current profit/sales 
ratio. Compared with in-in M&As, out-in M&As bring a larger and quicker improvement in TFP and 
the profit rate but no increase in target firms’ employment two years after the acquisition. 
 
To sum up the above results, both the selection effect and the technology-transfer effect appear to 
play a role in explaining the positive correlation between foreign ownership and productivity. The 
transfer of intangible assets from foreign firms to M&A takeover targets represents one important 
avenue by which Japan can benefit from FDI, and the evidence presented here shows that such a 
technology-transfer effect is indeed operating. 
 
3. The Macroeconomic Impact of Inward FDI 
 
In March 2006, then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi set a new goal on inward FDI.
4 The target 
was to achieve an increase of the inward FDI stock to 5 percent of GDP by the end of 2011. In his 
policy speech to the 165
th session of the Diet (September 29, 2006), the new Prime Minister, Shinzo 
Abe, promised to aim for the early achievement of this goal by 2010. In this section, I estimate the 
macroeconomic impact inward FDI would have if the target was met.  
 
                                                        
4 The previous goal announced by Koizumi was to double the inward FDI stock from ¥6.6 trillion to 
¥13.2 trillion in the five year period from the end of 2001 to the end of 2006. By the end of 2005, the 
inward FDI stock stood at ¥11.9 trillion, very close to the target. But because of several large retreats, the 
inward FDI stock had plunged to ¥10.6 trillion by the end of June 2006 (preliminary estimate by the 
Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan). General Motors reduced its stake in Suzuki by ¥0.23 trillion 
in March, while Vodafone sold its portable phone business to Softbank in April in a deal worth ¥1.7 
trillion. 9 
 
Using Japan’s GDP in 2006 (¥510 trillion) and assuming a nominal GDP growth rate of 2.0 percent, 
the country’s GDP at the end of 2010 should be around ¥552 trillion. 5 percent of this – the target for 
the inward FDI stock – amounts to about ¥27.6 trillion. At the end of June 2006, the inward FDI 
stock was ¥10.6 trillion. Therefore, I estimate the macroeconomic impact of an increase in the 
inward FDI stock by ¥17.0 trillion. However, rather than basing the estimation of the 
macroeconomic impact on the increase in the inward FDI stock, it is more appropriate to consider 
the increase in the presence of foreign-owned firms in the economy this translates into.  
 
As a first step, let us estimate how much the employment and the value added of foreign firms would 
increase. Based on micro-data from the Establishment and Enterprise Surveys for 1996 and 2001, 
the Fukao et al. study suggests that between these two years, the number of workers employed by the 
Japanese affiliates of foreign firms (33.4 percent or more foreign-owned) increased by 271,000, from 
485,000 to 756,000. During the same period, the inward FDI stock increased by ¥3.16 trillion, from 
¥3.47 trillion to ¥6.63. This means that an increase of the inward FDI stock of ¥11.7 million was 
needed for each additional person employed by a foreign-owned firm in Japan. If we assume that 
this relationship remained unchanged from 2001 to 2006, then the number of employees at foreign-
owned firms in Japan as of June of 2006 was an estimated 1,095,000 (=756,000+(10,600,000–
6,630,000)/11.7). A further increase of the inward FDI stock by ¥17.0 trillion from June 2006 to 
2010 thus would raise the number of employees of foreign-owned firms by an additional 1,453,000. 
According to this “back of the envelope” calculation, if Abe’s goal is accomplished, the number of 
workers employed by foreign-owned firms would more than triple by 2010 compared with the 
number in 2001, from 756,000 to 2,548,000.  
 
Using information on the average per-capita gross value added in each industry at the 3-digit 
industry level, Fukao et al. estimated that the 756,000 employees of foreign-owned firms in 2001 
created gross value added of ¥8.1 trillion. That is, the average per capita gross value added of 
foreign-owned firms was ¥10.7 million. As labor productivity improves, per capita gross value added 
usually increases over time. If we assume that the average per capita nominal gross value added of 
foreign-owned firms increases by 2.5 percent annually from 2001 to 2010, the estimated 1,095,000 
employees in 2006 created ¥13.3 trillion of gross value added, equivalent to approximately 2.6 
percent of GDP.
5 And in 2010, the estimated 2,548,000 employees of foreign-owned firms would 
create ¥34.0 trillion of gross value added, which would be about 6.2 percent of Japan’s projected 
GDP in that year. 
 
As I explained above, these results do not mean that the additional FDI will raise Japan’s GDP by as 
                                                        
5 The figure for Japan’s GDP in 2006 is based on the second preliminary estimate published on February 
15, 2007. 10 
 
much as 3.6 percent. A large part of the increase in foreign-owned firms’ production will be canceled 
out by a corresponding decline in domestic firms’ production. From this general equilibrium point of 
view, the major benefit of the new FDI will be the improvement of Japan’s total factor productivity.  
 
The empirical results reported in the previous section suggest that foreign firms’ average TFP level is 
8 percent higher than that of domestic firms. However, it was also shown that foreign firms enjoy 
higher TFP levels partly because they purchase Japanese firms that already have higher productivity 
than the average firm.
6 But the Japanese firms newly acquired by a foreign firm also display a 
further 2.2-percent increase of their TFP level in comparison with other domestic firms two years 
after the acquisition (see the coefficient on the out-in M&A dummy in the first estimation in Table 7). 
Because large-scale FDI and out-in M&As are such a recent phenomenon in Japan, and the data used 
in the empirical investigation reported above only go up to 2001, the time span covered is relatively 
short. It is therefore difficult at this stage to assess the long-term effects of acquisitions by foreign 
firms on the TFP level of acquired Japanese firms.  
 
Based on the considerations above, the simulation of the macroeconomic impact of inward FDI 
considers different scenarios for the increase in foreign firms’ gross value added share in the 
Japanese economy and the effect of out-in acquisitions on TFP. For the standard scenario, let us 
assume that the increase in the share of the gross value added by foreign firms in Japan’s total GDP 
by as much as 3.6 percentage points is the result of out-in acquisitions. Moreover, let us also assume 
that out-in acquisitions increase the TFP level of purchased Japanese firms by 5 percent in the long 
run. A 5-percent increase in the TFP level means that Japanese firms purchased by foreign firms can 
produce 5 percent more output from the same amount of input. This change in itself will increase 
Japan’s GDP. But from a general equilibrium point of view, many other additional changes in the 
Japanese economy are expected. First, the improvement in TFP raises the demand for labor and 
increases the real wage rate. Second, the improvement in TFP raises rate of return to capital and will 
induce new capital accumulation. This capital accumulation will further increase Japan’s GDP. Third, 
the increase in investment will reduce Japan’s saving-investment balance, the current account 
surplus and capital outflows. Fourth, dividend payments abroad by foreign-owned firms and the fall 
in Japan’s foreign investment income, caused by the decline in capital outflows, mean that the 
increase in Japan’s GNP, which includes net foreign investment income, will be smaller than the 
increase in Japan’s GDP. 
 
Taking these additional changes into account, I evaluate the overall effects of inward FDI on Japan’s 
GDP and GNP by constructing a general equilibrium model of the economy. We should note that the 
                                                        
6 Because the majority of inward direct investments in developed economies such as Japan are conducted 
as M&As and not as greenfield investments, it is appropriate to concentrate on the TFP level of acquired 
domestic firms here. 11 
 
assumptions here, a 5 percent increase in the TFP level and a 3.6 percentage point increase of 
foreign-owned firms’ production share in GDP from 2006 to 2010, are relatively conservative. 
Firstly, inward FDI might bring larger TFP improvements. The comparison of the TFP levels of 
Japanese and foreign-owned firms in Section 2 is based on data for the manufacturing sector. But 
according to several preceding studies (Baily and Solow 2001; Fukao and Miyagawa 2007), Japan’s 
labor productivity level is on par with the US and major European economies in the case of 
manufacturing industries. On the other hand, Japan’s labor productivity level in many non-
manufacturing sectors, such as retail and construction, is only about two-thirds or less of labor 
productivity levels in the US and major European economies. Therefore, FDI from developed 
economies in Japan’s non-manufacturing sectors would probably bring much larger TFP gains than 
suggested by the estimates above for the manufacturing sector. Secondly, there is considerable scope 
for the share of foreign owned firms’ production to increase by much more than the 3.6 percentage 
points, if Japan were to abolish obstacles to inward FDI and the presence of foreign-owned firms 
increased to levels similar to those in other developed economies. In 2002, foreign-owned firms’ 
share in manufacturing turnover was only 2.6 percent in Japan, but 20.3 percent in the US, 24.4 
percent in Germany, 35.9 percent in France, and 36.1 percent in the UK. In services, foreign owned 
firms’ share in turnover in Japan was 0.9 percent compared with 7.8 percent in the US, 8.7 percent in 
Germany, 9.5 percent in France, and 16.8 percent in the UK (OECD 2005). Thus, even if foreign-
owned firms’ share in turnover in Japan were to triple or quadruple, it would still only be half or less 
of that in other major economies.  
 
Based on these considerations, four scenarios are considered. The standard scenario shows the 
potential macroeconomic impact based on the assumption that the TFP improvement and the 
increase in the presence of foreign-owned firms is relatively moderate in line with the estimation 
results for TFP and the government target. In addition, however, alternative scenarios are also 
considered. The first alternative scenario assumes that the TFP improvement effect in the service 
sector, and hence overall, is probably much greater than in the manufacturing sector. The second 
alternative assumes a much larger in increase in the presence of foreign firms to illustrate the impact 
that FDI could have even at levels that would still lag considerably behind those of other advanced 
economies. The last scenario, finally, combines the assumptions of a larger TFP improvement and a 
larger increase in FDI. Thus, the following four cases are examined:   
 
Case I (standard scenario): a 5 percent improvement of the TFP level and a 3.6 percentage-point 
increase in foreign-owned firms’ share in production. 
Case II: a 15 percent improvement of the TFP level and a 3.6 percentage-point increase in foreign-
owned firms’ share in production (i.e., it is assumed that the improvement of the TFP level 
is three times as great as in the standard scenario). 12 
 
Case III: a 5 percent improvement of the TFP level and a 10.8 percentage-point increase in foreign-
owned firms’ share in production (i.e., it is assumed that the increase in foreign firms’ 
presence is three times as great as in the standard scenario). 
Case IV: a 15 percent improvement of the TFP level and a 10.8 percentage-point increase in foreign-
owned firms’ share in production. 
 
The details of the analysis are reported in Appendix A. The main assumptions on which the 
macroeconomic model is based can be summarized as follows:  
 
(1)  In order to explain the coexistence of productive and unproductive firms, it is necessary to 
assume that firms produce differentiated products. It is also assumed that firms operate 
under monopolistic competition. In such an economy, out-in acquisitions may bring two 
types of innovation. Using foreign parent firms’ technology, domestic firms may improve 
their production process (process innovation). Alternatively, they may increase the variety 
of their products (product innovation). In order to simplify the analysis, I assume that only 
process innovations will occur. 
(2)  The analysis is static, this is, it only examines the long-run effect of a one-time acquisition 
of domestic firms by foreign firms. In order to simplify the analysis, the employment and 
production share of foreign-owned firms in the Japanese economy are assumed to increase 
from zero to 3.6 percent or 10.8 percent.  
(3)  All products are internationally traded without trade costs. Very smooth international 
indirect capital flows ensure that Japan’s real interest rate is equal to the world real interest 
rate. 
(4)  The world equilibrium interest rate and the world price level will not be affected by the 
increase in Japan’s inward FDI.  
 
The results of the simulation analysis are shown in Table 9. The second column of the table shows 
the results for Case I: a 5 percent improvement of the TFP level and a 3.6 percentage point increase 
in foreign-owned firms’ share. The second row of the table shows that in Case I, the increase in 
inward FDI will raise Japan’s real wage rate by 0.17 percent. As I explained in Section 1, FDI 
consists of international capital flows accompanied by the transfer of intangible assets. According to 
standard economic theory on the international movement of production factors, in the FDI host 
country, the higher productivity of foreign firms will increase real wage rates and benefit workers. 
The higher rate of return to capital will induce capital deepening through capital imports, and this 
capital deepening will also raise real wage rates and benefit workers in the host country. The 0.17 
percent increase of the real wage rate shown in Table 9 is the result of all these effects combined. In 
our macro-model, the ratio of the increase in the capital stock to the initial capital stock is also 0.17 13 
 
percent. The increase of the average level of firms’ productivity and the capital deepening induced 
by the higher rate of return to capital together raise Japan’s GDP by 0.24 percent in Case I. This is a 
permanent increase, i.e., wages and GDP will be higher by this amount in every year.  
 
When we assume that inward FDI raises the TFP level three times as much (Case II) or the increase 
in foreign-owned firms’ share is three times as great (Case III), the impact in terms of the increase in 
the wage rate, induced capital deepening, and the increase in GDP almost triples in comparison with 
Case I. That is, the size of the macroeconomic impact is almost proportionate to the magnitude of 
either the TFP improvement or the increase in inward FDI. In the case of the most optimistic 
scenario, Case IV, we can expect large increase in real wages and GDP. 
 
INSERT Table 9 
 
Dividend payments abroad by foreign-owned firms and the fall in Japan’s foreign investment income 
caused by the inflow of capital (or the decline in capital outflows) mean that the increase in Japan’s 
GNP (which includes net foreign investment income) will be smaller than the increase in GDP. How 
the increase in GNP will differ from the increase in GDP is also shown in Table 9. Inward FDI will 
change Japan’s international asset-liability position in three respects: first, foreign investment 
increases Japan’s international liabilities and overseas investors will receive the profits earned by 
foreign-owned firms in Japan. Under our assumptions, which are explained in Appendix A, dividend 
payments from foreign-owned firms in Japan to foreign investors will be 0.36 percent of total GDP 
in Case I. Second, in compensation for the sale of Japanese firms, Japanese residents will receive 
foreign assets. It is assumed that Japanese residents use this money as portfolio investment abroad. 
Investment income from Japan's assets abroad received in compensation for the sale of Japanese 
firms will be 0.30 percent of total GDP. Third, the capital accumulation induced by inward FDI will 
cause capital inflows and increase Japan’s liabilities to non-residents. Interest payments abroad for 
Japan’s liabilities resulting from the capital deepening induced by inward FDI will be 0.05 percent of 
total GDP. These three changes in Japan’s international asset-liability position will permanently 
change Japan’s balance of payments. Taken together, these effects  will reduce Japan’s income 
account surplus by 0.11 percent of Japan’s GDP in Case I. Thus, subtracting this income account 
effect from the increase in GDP through inward FDI, the increase in GNP will be 0.24–0.11=0.13 
percent of GDP.  
 
In Case III, which assumes that the increase in foreign-owned firms’ share is three times as large as 
in the standard scenario (Case I), the change in the balance of payments and in GNP are also about 
three times as large. On the other hand, in Case II, which assumes an improvement of TFP through 
inward FDI three times as great as in the standard scenario, the effect on the balance of payments is 14 
 
slightly less than three times as large and the increase in GNP therefore slightly more than three 




In this paper, I examined the macroeconomic impact of inward FDI in Japan. From a general 
equilibrium point of view, probably the most important host country benefit of inward FDI is the 
improvement in productivity caused by the inflow of managerial resources. In the first part of the 
paper, mainly referring to the results of Fukao, Ito and Kwon (2005), I reviewed the evidence 
suggesting that inward FDI will raise the average TFP level of firms in Japan. In the second part of 
the paper, using a general equilibrium model of an open macroeconomy, I simulated the 
macroeconomic impact of an increase in the inward FDI stock. I found that if Prime Minister Abe’s 
goal on inward FDI, which is to increase the inward FDI stock to 5 percent of GDP by the end of 
2010, is attained, Japan’s GDP will increase by 0.24 percent and Japan’s real wage rate will rise by 
0.17 percent. Dividend payments abroad by foreign-owned firms and the fall in Japan’s foreign 
investment income caused by the inflow of capital (or the decline in capital outflows), will make the 
increase in Japan’s GNP (which includes net foreign investment income) smaller than the increase in 
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Appendix A. Macroeconomic Simulation Analysis of the Impact of Inward FDI in Japan 
 
This appendix provides the details of the macroeconomic simulation of the impact of inward FDI 
based on a model of the Japanese economy with microeconomic foundations. 
 
 
Basic assumptions on market and technology 
 
The simulation is based on a model with monopolistic competition. It is assumed that in Japan, n 
commodities are produced by n firms and each commodity is produced by one firm. There are nθF 
foreign firms and n(1–θF) domestic firms. All products are final goods and internationally traded and 
there are no trade costs. All consumers, domestic and foreign, have identical homothetic preferences 




















where Xi denotes the demand for firm i’s product, pi, is the price of firm i’s product, and p* stands 
for the world price level. 1/(1–σ) is the price demand elasticity. It is assumed that 1/(1–σ) is greater 
than one. The parameter E denotes the size of world wide demand. It is also assumed that Japan is 
not a large country and p* and E can be treated as constant over time.  
 
A Cobb-Douglas constant return production function is assumed: 
β β − =
1
i i i i K L a X  (2) 
where Li and Ki denote firm i’s labor and capital input and ai denotes the TFP level of firm i. Labor 
and capital markets are competitive so that the cost share of labor is equal to the constant parameter 
β. 
 
The introduction of managerial resources through out-in acquisitions can be expressed in the model 
in at least two ways. First, foreign firms can produce with a higher TFP level, ai (process innovation). 
Second, foreign firms can produce new goods, so that the number of commodities produced in Japan, 
n, increases (product innovation). For simplicity, the analysis here focuses on the first type of 
innovation as a result of managerial resource transfers. In the baseline scenario, it is assumed that 
foreign firms’ TFP level, aF, is 5 percent higher than domestic firms’ TFP level, aJ.  
 
Let r denote the constant world equilibrium real interest rate. Further assumptions are that domestic 




The profit maximization behavior of firms 
 
In production function (2), marginal cost does not depend on the production level and can be 
expressed by 
  
β β − =






i i  (3) 
 
where w denotes the domestic real wage rate and B stands for (β/(1–β))
1–β+ ((1–β)/β)
β. When firms 
operate under monopolistic competition and the price demand elasticity is 1/(1–σ), profit 
maximizing firms set the price level equal to marginal costs times 1/σ. These conditions yield the 















































































Foreign firms, which have a higher TFP level, aF, and can produce output at lower marginal cost, set 
lower sales prices and produce more output than domestic firms (equation (4)). The total sales of 
foreign firms are (aF/aJ)
σ(1–σ) times greater than the total sales of domestic firms. And both foreign 






The labor market equilibrium condition  
 
The equilibrium condition for the labor market can be expressed by 
 
() L nL nL F F J F = + − θ θ 1 .  
 































































































where L denotes Japan’s total labor endowment, which is assumed to be constant. The domestic real 
wage rate is determined by the above equation. Equation (7) shows that inward FDI (an increase in 
θF) will increase the demand for labor and raise the equilibrium real wage rate. Since the price level 
p* remains unchanged, the level of workers’ welfare will be improved by inward FDI.  
 
Capital accumulation induced by FDI 
 
Productive foreign firms enjoy higher returns to capital and this fact will induce capital accumulation. 










where  L and K denote Japan’s total endowment of labor and total input of capital. Under the 
assumption of perfect international capital mobility, the capital input level, K, is endogenously 
determined by the above equation. Therefore, the increase in capital input is proportional to the 
increase in the real wage rate. 
 
 
Japan’s GDP before and after inward FDI 
 
Using the model just developed it is possible to determine how inward FDI changes Japan’s GDP. To 
simplify the analysis, an equilibrium without inward FDI (θF =0) and another equilibrium with 
inward FDI (θF >0) are compared. 
 
When there is no inward FDI, all firms have the same productivity level and produce the same 
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where K0 denotes the total input of capital stock in Japan. When FDI occurs and θFn firms are 
purchased by foreign firms, the real GDP level can be expressed by 
 
() ( ) () ()
β β β β θ θ
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where F and D stand for the set of foreign firms and the set of domestic firms. w0 and w1 denote the 
wage rate before and after the inward FDI, which can be calculated using Equation (7). 
 
 
Assumptions on parameter values 
 
By setting the parameter values, it is possible to simulate the macroeconomic impact of inward FDI. 21 
 
The cost share of labor, β, is assumed to be equal to 2/3 and the price demand elasticity, 1/(1–σ), to 
be equal to 5 (this means that the mark-up rate will be (1/σ-1)*100=25 percent). As explained in 
Section 4, four cases are examined. Here, the calibration for Case I is explained in detail. In Case I, it 
is assumed that foreign firms’ TFP is 5 percent higher than domestic firms’ TFP, i.e., aF/aJ=1.05. The 







The above equation means that after the inward FDI took place, foreign firms’ share of total sales 
and of labor input in the Japanese economy overall will be equal to 3.6 percent. The solution of the 





The results of the simulation analysis are shown in Table 9. They show that the increase in inward 
FDI assumed in Case I will raise the real wage rate and total capital input by 0.17 percent and lift 
GDP by 0.24 percent. Wages and GDP will be permanently higher by this amount. 
 
The effects on Japan’s balance of payments 
 
Dividend payments abroad by domestic firms and the fall in Japan’s foreign investment income 
caused by the inflow of capital (or the decline in capital outflows) mean that the increase in Japan’s 
GNP (which includes net foreign investment income) will be smaller than the increase in Japan’s 
GDP. Table 9 shows how the increase in GNP will differ from the increase in GDP. Inward FDI will 
change Japan’s international asset-liability position in three respects. First, inward foreign 
investment will increase Japan’s international liabilities, since foreign investors will receive part of 
the profits earned by foreign owned firms in Japan. Typically, foreign investors receive only part of 
the profits because when the foreign capital participation rate in a particular firm is less than one, 
then domestic investors will also receive their share. In addition, the Japanese government will 
receive corporate income taxes from firms in Japan. Second, in compensation for the sale of 
Japanese firms, Japanese residents will receive foreign assets. It is assumed that Japanese residents 
use these funds for portfolio investment abroad. Third, capital accumulation induced by inward FDI 
will cause capital inflows and increase Japan’s liabilities to non-residents. These changes in Japan’s 
international asset-liability position will permanently change Japan’s balance of payments. In the 




(1) Dividend payments to foreign owners 
 
In the model, 20 percent of GDP is monopolistic rent. To simplifying the analysis, it is assumed that 
firms pay the entire rent to their stockholders as dividends and all the real capital accumulation is 
financed through indirect financing. If the conditions for the Modigliani-Miller theorem hold, then 
firms’ financial structure will not change the results. It is assumed that the average capital 
participation rate of foreign parent firms’ in their Japanese affiliates is 50 percent. It is also assumed 
that there is not corporate income tax. In Case I, after the FDI, foreign firms’ market share is 3.6 
percent. Therefore, foreign parent firms receive 0.5×0.2×0.036×GDP1 in annual dividends, where 
GDP1 denotes Japan’s GDP after the inward FDI. Therefore, given the simulated increase in GDP as 
a result of inward FDI by 0.24 percent and using the relationship GDP1/GDP0=1.0024, dividend 
payments to foreign owners in terms of GDP0 are 0.5×0.2×0.036×GDP1=0.0036× GDP0.  
 
 
(2) Foreign income from Japan’s portfolio assets abroad received in compensation for the sale of 
Japanese firms 
 
Before the inward FDI, the total value of Japanese firms’ stocks is 0.2×GDP0/r, where r denotes the 
world equilibrium interest rate. 50 percent ownership of θF percent of Japanese firms is sold to 
foreign firms. In exchange, Japanese residents receive 0.5×θF×0.2×GDP0/r in foreign assets. The 
annual investment income from these assets will be 0.5×θF×0.2×GDP0=0.003×GDP0. 
 
 
(3) Interest payment abroad for Japan’s liabilities created by the capital accumulation induced by 
inward FDI 
 
Adding the simulated increase in Japan’s capital stock through FDI of 0.17 percent to the existing 
capital stock (1+0.0017), the share of the foreign capital stock as a result of this FDI is 0.17 percent 
(i.e., 0.0017/(1+0.0017)=0.17 percent). Interest payments abroad for these liabilities on Japan’s part 
are 0.0017×r×K1. Since the cost share of capital is 0.3333 and the mark-up rate is 25 percent, the 
interest payments are equal to 0.0017×0.3333×0.8×GDP1= 0.0005×GDP0. 
 
Taken together, these effects will reduce Japan’s income account surplus by 0.36–0.30+0.05=0.11 
percent of Japan’s GDP. Therefore the increase in GNP will be 0.24–0.11=0.13 percent of GDP.  
 Source: Fukao, Ito and Kwon (2005).
23TFP level
0.0773 *** 0.0037 2.7577 *** 0.0065 *** 1.4956 ***
(18.35) (1.09) (4.00) (5.80) (9.79)
_cons -0.0524 *** 0.0025 *** 8.5831 *** 0.0038 *** 0.6475 ***
(-21.29) (3.03) (51.93) (20.53) (18.76)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummy*Year dummy yes no no no no
No. of observations 93880 70332 93880 93880 93880
0.0192 *** -0.0230 ** 1.2754 *** 0.0003 16.2696 *** 0.0121
(6.36) (-2.00) (18.52) (0.03) (7.91) (1.17)
_cons 0.0169 *** 0.0477511 *** 3.4736 *** -0.0042 ** 31.9526 *** 0.0379 ***
(20.13) (12.79) (178.78) (-2.13) (73.06) (17.51)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of observations 93880 70332 93880 70332 93880 70332
Notes) 1.Pooled data for 1994-2000 are used.
        2. The values in parentheses are t-statistics.
        3.*P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.1 (two-tailed test).
Source: Fukao, Ito and Kwon (2005)
Foreign-ownership dummy (majority-




owned by one foreign firm)
Current profit-
sales ratio (%)
Growth  rate of
real assets




























TFP level 93880 -0.0216 0.1022 -0.4905 0.5076
Growth rate of TFP 70332 0.0058 0.0634 -0.5430 0.6132
R&D investment-sales ratio 93880 0.0086 0.0202 0.0000 1.6391
No. of years passed since established 93880 36.6372 15.0046 0.0000 110.0000
(No. of years passed since established)^2 93880 1567.42 1159.86 0.0000 12100.00
Outsourcing ratio 93880 0.1071 0.1496 0.0000 9.8890
ln(Sales) 93880 8.4190 1.2958 4.8255 16.0220
(ln(Sales))^2 93880 72.5595 23.7767 23.2855 256.7040
Share of non-production workers in total workers 93880 0.3315 0.2492 0.0000 1.0000
Source: Fukao, Ito and Kwon (2005).
25Table 4. Estimation results: determinants of TFP level and TFP growth rate
Table 4.a Dependent variable: TFP level
0.0521 *** 0.0488 *** 0.0031 0.0031
(18.43) (17.26) (0.96) (0.96)
0.0377 *** 0.0003
(29.79) (0.24)
0.2067 *** 0.1518 *** -0.1208 *** -0.1208 ***
(7.02) (5.96) (-7.69) (-7.70)
-0.0007 *** -0.0008 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0004 ***
(-9.43) (-10.45) (3.44) (3.44)
0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ** 0.0000 **
(5.82) (6.37) (-2.11) (-2.11)
Outsourcing ratio 0.0087 *** 0.0064 *** -0.0030 -0.0030
(4.14) (3.14) (-1.58) (1.58)
ln(Sales) 0.1339 *** 0.1282 *** 0.2418 *** 0.2418 ***
(66.71) (63.96) (35.21) (35.20)
(ln(Sales))^2 -0.0056 *** -0.0053 *** -0.0073 *** -0.0073 ***
(-51.26) (-49.00) (-18.20) (-18.20)
Constant -0.7592 *** -0.7419 *** -1.5198 *** -1.5199 ***
(-80.81) (-79.25) (-50.53) (-50.53)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes
Year dummy yes yes yes yes
Industry dummy*Year dummy yes yes yes yes
Firm dummy no no yes yes
Number of observations 93880 93880 93880 93880
Number of groups - - 19652 19652
Notes) 1.The values in parentheses are t-statistics.
           2.*P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.1 (two-tailed test).
Foreign-ownership dummy
(33.4% or more is owned by
Foreign-ownership dummy
(majority-owned by one foreign
No. of years passed since
established
(No. of years passed since
established)^2
Ratio of non-production workers
R&D investment-sales ratio
26Table 4. Estimation results: determinants of TFP level and TFP growth rate
Table 4.b Dependent variable: growth rate of TFP
Lagged TFP level -0.2817 *** -0.2792 *** -0.8325 *** -0.8324 ***
(-86.60) (-86.52) (-223.08) (-222.94)
0.0145 *** 0.0155 *** -0.0072 -0.0076
(4.56) (4.92) (-1.15) (-1.21)
0.0074 *** 0.0021
(7.58) (1.36)
0.0234 * -0.1276 ***
(1.81) (-7.37)
-0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0006 ***
(-7.24) (-6.88) (4.72) (4.72)
0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
(4.57) (4.37) (-3.09) (-3.07)
Outsourcing ratio -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0076 *** -0.0079 ***
(-0.41) (-0.17) (-3.36) (-3.46)
ln(Sales) 0.0421 *** 0.0426 *** 0.2369 *** 0.2361 ***
(27.92) (28.34) (29.16) (29.06)
(ln(Sales))^2 -0.0017 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0063 *** -0.0063 ***
(-21.82) (-22.16) (-13.40) (-13.26)
Constant -0.2250 *** -0.2263 *** -1.5209 *** -1.5192 ***
(-31.16) (-31.34) (-42.13) (-42.06)
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes
Year dummy yes yes yes yes
Firm dummy no no yes yes
Number of observations 70332 70332 70332 70332
Number of groups - - 16471 16471
Notes) 1.The values in parentheses are t-statistics.
           2.*P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.1 (two-tailed test).
Source: Fukao, Ito and Kwon (2005).
(No. of years passed since
established)^2
R&D investment-sales ratio
Ratio of non-production workers
Foreign-ownership dummy
(majority-owned by one foreign
Foreign-ownership dummy
(33.4% or more is owned by
No. of years passed since
established
27Table 5. Number of out-in and in-in M&A cases









Source: Fukao, Ito and Kwon (2005).
281.930 1.525 1.542 -0.027 0.129 0.195
(4.05) *** (3.28) *** (2.47) *** (-0.23) (1.05) (1.24)
-0.172 -0.233
(-0.18) (-0.98)
0.006 0.007 0.042 -0.064 -0.055 -0.047
(0.20) (0.23) (1.25) (-5.19) *** (-4.42) *** (-3.28) ***
1.250 1.836 -0.065 -0.058
(1.43) (1.74) * (-1.26) (-1.17)
-0.013 0.005 0.271 0.291
(-0.08) (0.03) (9.27) *** (8.37) ***
-3.298 -3.336 -4.201 -1.680 -1.929 -2.046
(-12.21) *** (-10.33) *** (-9.52) *** (-21.82) *** (-23.28) *** (-21.22) ***
1. The values in parentheses are z-statistics.
2. *P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.1 (two-tailed test).





TFP growth rate: ln(TFP)t-1-
ln(TFP)t-2
-485.76 -484.40
Sample size 67242 67240 81547
-339.65 Log pseudo-likelihood
(Total liability/total asset ratio)t-1
yes Year dummy yes
49204
Constant term




Table 6. What firms are chosen as M&A targets? Probit analysis
yes
yes










(2.30) ** (-0.44) (2.37) **
In-in M&A dummy 0.004 0.004 0.001
(1.75) * (0.56) (0.51)
ln(TFP)t-1 -0.316 0.148 0.071
(-60.78) *** (8.27) *** (4.31) ***
ln(number of workers)t-1 0.007 -0.022 -0.001
(23.67) *** (-28.00) *** (-3.34) ***
(Current Profit/Sales)t-1 -0.042 0.111 -0.871
(-2.30) ** (1.54) (-10.67) ***
(R&D/sales)t-1 0.216 0.089 0.140
(9.67) *** (1.99) ** (7.92) ***
-0.003 0.004 0.000
(-3.73) *** (2.37) ** (-0.19)
(Total liability/total asset)t-1 -0.002 -0.015 -0.038
(-1.36) (-3.16) *** (-7.01) ***
(Sales/number of workers)t-1 0.000
(6.44) ***
Constant term -0.026 0.127 0.061
(-9.37) *** (15.21) *** (8.09) ***
Industry dummy (30 industries)
Year dummy
Sample size
1. The values in parentheses are t-statistics based on White's method.
2. *P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.1 (two-tailed test).
Source: Fukao, Ito and Kwon (2005).
Dummy for firms which do not report
R&D expenditure in t-1
Table 7. Dynamic effects of M&A: Effects two years later
Out-in M&A dummy (based on
majority ownership by one foreign
TFP growth rate:
ln(TFP)t+1-ln(TFP)t-1
Growth rate of number of
workers: from t-1 to t+1
Change of (Current
profit/Sales): from t-1 to
30Dependent variable
0.018 -0.032 0.016
(1.66) * (-0.64) (1.90) *
In-in M&A dummy 0.010 0.015 0.000  
(3.59) *** (1.84) * (0.05)
ln(TFP)t-1 -0.369 0.189 0.063
(-72.08) *** (8.73) *** (4.76) ***
ln(number of workers)t-1 0.009 -0.030 -0.001
(24.73) *** (-29.29) *** (-3.07) ***
(Current Profit/Sales)t-1 -0.031 0.119 -0.903
(-2.64) *** (1.41) (-13.64) ***
(R&D/sales)t-1 0.238 0.220 0.128
(7.81) *** (3.33) *** (6.29) ***
-0.003 0.009 -0.001
(-3.49) *** (4.08) *** (-0.92)
(Total liability/total asset)t-1 0.000 -0.019 -0.038
(-0.25) (-3.17) *** (-7.05) ***
(Sales/number of workers)t-1 0.000
(6.44) ***
Constant term -0.051 0.178 0.060
(-17.32) *** (17.11) *** (9.14) ***
Industry dummy (30 industries)
Year dummy
Sample size
1. The values in parentheses are t-statistics based on White's method.
2. *P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.1 (two-tailed test).
Source: Fukao, Ito and Kwon (2005).
Table 8. Dynamic effects of M&A: Effects three years later
TFP growth rate:
ln(TFP)t+2-ln(TFP)t-1
Growth rate of number of
workers: from t-1 to t+2
Change of (Current
Profit/Sales): from t-1 to
t+2
Out-in M&A dummy (based on
majority ownership by one foreign
Dummy for firms which do not report
R&D expenditure in t-1
31Case I Case II Case III Case IV
1.05 1.15 1.05 1.15
3.6 3.6 10.8 10.8
Increase in wages 0.17% 0.42% 0.53% 1.30%
Increase of capital stock 0.17% 0.42% 0.53% 1.30%
Increase of real GDP a 0.24% 0.68% 0.72% 2.06%
Dividend payment from foreign-owned firms to foreign
investors/GDP
b 0.36% 0.36% 1.09% 1.10%
Investment income from Japan's assets abroad, which are received
in compensation for sales of Japanese firms/GDP
c 0.30% 0.21% 0.91% 0.65%
Interest payment abroad for Japan’s liability, which is created by
capital accumulation induced by inward FDI/GDP
d 0.05% 0.11% 0.14% 0.35%
Net change of Japan's international investment account/GDP
e=−
b+c−d
-0.11% -0.27% -0.32% -0.81%
Increase of real GNP/GDP f=a+e 0.13% 0.41% 0.39% 1.25%
Table 9. Simulation results of the macroeconomic impact of inward FDI in Japan
ssumptions;         foreign-owned firms' TFP level/domestic firms' TFP level
Increase of foreign-owned firms' output share (percentage points)
32